Double tax discrimination to attract FDI and fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules by Haufler, Andreas et al.
Double tax discrimination to attract 
FDI and fight profit shifting: The role 
of CFC rules  
 
WP 17/02 
The paper is circulated for discussion purposes only, contents should be considered preliminary and are not to 
be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission. 
January 2017 
Andreas Haufler 
University of Munich, CESifo and NoCeT 
 
Mohammed Mardan 
ETH Zurich and NoCeT 
 
Dirk Schindler 
Norwegian School of Economics, NoCeT and 
CESifo 
 
Working paper series | 2017 
Double tax discrimination to attract FDI and fight
profit shifting: The role of CFC rules∗
Andreas Haufler†
University of Munich, CESifo and NoCeT
Mohammed Mardan‡
ETH Zurich and NoCeT
Dirk Schindler§
Norwegian School of Economics, NoCeT and CESifo
January 2017
Abstract
Governments worldwide use targeted tax policies to trade off the gains from
increased FDI against the cost of excessive profit shifting by multinational firms.
We show that optimal tax systems generally incorporate both thin capitalization
rules, which tax discriminate between purely national and multinational firms, and
controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, which discriminate between home-based
and foreign-based multinationals. Introducing CFC rules is optimal if investment
elasticities of home-based and foreign-based multinationals differ due to transac-
tion costs for FDI. We also analyze the effects of reduced transaction costs for
FDI and reduced costs for debt shifting on the optimal policy mix. Our results
correspond to the observed development of anti-avoidance rules in OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been among the most important dimensions of the
continuing globalization of the world economy. Governments try to attract FDI because
it can provide a number of benefits such as increased employment, higher wages and
positive technological spillovers to domestic firms that spur economic growth.1 In order
to attract FDI, governments often make use of preferential tax regimes. The reason for
using such targeted policies is that tax breaks are confined to large, internationally mobile
firms that undertake FDI, while the losses for corporate tax revenues are minimized by
keeping the tax burden stable for smaller firms that operate only in the home country.
A policy that features prominently in this regard is to allow multinational companies
to shift some of their profits to affiliates in low-tax countries; an option that is not
available to purely national firms.2 International profit shifting is in turn one of the most
important reasons behind empirical results that, in high-tax host countries, subsidiaries
of multinational groups pay between 33% and 50% less in corporate taxes, relative to
comparable domestic firms (Egger et al., 2010).
In recent years, however, many countries have seen a need to respond to increasingly
aggressive profit shifting by multinational firms. One important channel of profit shifting
is that multinationals deduct interest expenses from the tax base of an affiliate hosted
in a high-tax country, which arise from loans granted by a related foreign entity located
in a tax haven. An increasing number of countries has thus limited the amount of tax-
deductible interest expenses using thin-capitalization rules (see Bu¨ttner et al., 2012 and
Table 1 below). By choosing the tightness of these thin-capitalization rules, the host
country can change the effective tax rate of multinational companies without changing
its statutory tax rate. Hence, thin-capitalization rules allow governments to balance the
gains from FDI against the costs arising from profit shifting.
An important aspect of thin-capitalization rules is that the tax deductions they al-
low can equally be used by home-based and foreign-based multinationals. However, due
to the existence of trade costs that create a “home market bias” (see, e.g., Krugman,
1980), the elasticity with which investment by home-based multinationals responds to
tax incentives is generally lower than that of foreign-based multinational companies.
As a result, governments would also like to tax discriminate between home-based and
1Haskel et al. (2007) and Keller and Yeaple (2009), among others, empirically demonstrate the positive
technological spillovers of inward FDI for the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Hijzen
et al. (2013) find positive effects of inward FDI on wages and employment in a cross-country study using
microeconomic data from both developed and developing countries.
2The rationality of policies permitting some profit shifting for multinational firms is demonstrated,
for example, by Peralta et al. (2006) and by Hong and Smart (2010).
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foreign-based multinationals by setting less generous thin-capitalization rules for the for-
mer. However, this tax discrimination between multinationals is generally not possible
using thin-capitalization rules alone.3
In this paper, we show that one policy allowing governments to tax discriminate
between home-based and foreign-based multinational companies is the use of controlled-
foreign-company (CFC) rules.4 CFC rules have recently received considerable attention
in the OECD’s ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (BEPS), which regards
them as a core measure to combat ‘excessive’ deductions for interest expenses and other
financial transactions (OECD, 2013, action 3; 2015). CFC rules generally focus on so-
called ‘passive income’, for example interest payments and royalties, which can easily be
placed in affiliates in tax havens without having a substantial physical presence there.5
They reserve the right of the tax authority in the parent country of a multinational
firm to add the (passive) income from this multinational’s foreign affiliates in low-tax
countries to the parent company’s tax base, thus subjecting it to the higher rate of the
parent country.6 Typically, CFC rules stipulate a minimum effective tax rate that must
be levied in the host country of the affiliate in order to avoid this additional taxation in
the parent country. The closer this minimum tax rate is to the statutory corporate tax
rate in the parent country, the stricter is the CFC rule. Importantly, CFC rules do not
apply to multinationals headquartered abroad. In sum, CFC rules allow a parent country
to increase the effective tax rate of its home-based multinational companies only.
In 2014, more than 30 countries worldwide used CFC rules to limit profit shifting
by multinational companies. Table 1 summarizes both CFC rules and thin-capitalization
rules of all OECD countries for which we could retrieve data for the years 2000 (or 2004)
and 2014, and compares the regulation over time.7 The table shows that many countries
have tightened their thin-capitalization rules since the year 2000. CFC rules have also
3In its 2002 Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling, for example, the European Court of Justice has decided that
thin-capitalization rules in the European Economic Area must not be designed in a way that discriminates
between multinationals from different EU member states.
4CFC rules were first introduced as ‘Subpart F’ legislation in the United States in 1964. See Deloitte
(2014) for a recent overview of CFC rules employed worldwide, and Lang et al. (2004) for a detailed
discussion from a legal perspective.
5See Dischinger and Riedel (2011) for evidence that patents are placed in low-tax countries and Bergin
(2012) for a case study of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom. An empirical study of which countries
become tax havens is Dharmapala and Hines (2009).
6CFC rules therefore override the tax-exemption principle, under which the parent country does not
tax the profits of foreign affiliates of a resident MNC. This scheme, also labelled the ‘source country
principle’ of corporate taxation, is applied by most OECD countries, with the prominent exception of
the United States. See Becker and Fuest (2010) for a recent discussion and analysis.
7Thin-capitalization rules are characterized either by a ‘safe harbor’ debt-to-equity ratio for which
interest payments are always tax-deductible, or by an earnings stripping rule, which specifies the share of
tax-deductible interest payments in relation to EBIT(DA). In either case, a higher ratio implies a more
lenient thin-capitalization rule.
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been tightened during the same period, but in a smaller set of OECD countries.
****************** Insert Table 1 here ******************
Despite their empirical relevance, CFC rules have so far been left out of theoretical
analyses of how governments should respond to the profit shifting activities of multina-
tional firms. In the present paper we aim to fill this void and address two main issues
involving CFC rules. First, we ask under which conditions CFC rules are part of the
government’s optimal tax mix when the latter can endogenously choose the statutory
corporate tax rate, the thin-capitalization rule, and the CFC rule. In a second step, we
analyze how the optimal policy mix changes as a result of increased mobility of FDI (i.e.,
reduced transaction costs for FDI) on the one hand, and increased financial mobility (i.e.,
reduced profit shifting costs for multinationals) on the other. In doing so, our model is
the first to explain the role of CFC rules in international taxation, and it highlights how
and why countries may want to tax-discriminate between multinational companies.
To pursue these issues, we set up a model of two symmetric countries and a continuum
of tax havens with different tax rates. There are three types of firms in each country:
purely national firms, home-based multinationals, and foreign-based multinationals. All
firms choose their investment levels and the multinational companies additionally choose
the tax-optimized financial structure of their investment by shifting debt to a tax haven
of their choice.
Our analysis delivers the following results. In the policy optimum, each government
will set the thin-capitalization rule so as to permit multinationals operating in the home
country to deduct some internal debt from the corporate tax base, provided that the multi-
nationals’ investments react sufficiently elastic to the reduction in capital cost. Therefore,
some tax discrimination will occur between purely national versus multinational firms. In
addition, each government is more likely to impose a binding CFC rule on its home-based
multinational, the larger are the transaction costs for FDI and thus the larger is the ‘home
bias’ of multinationals’ investment. In this case, governments would like to tax discrim-
inate between home-based and foreign-based multinational companies, in favour of the
latter, but cannot do so via the thin-capitalization rule. Thus, governments use the CFC
rule to bring about the desired increase in the effective taxation of home-based multina-
tionals. As a result, purely national firms, home-based multinationals, and foreign-based
multinationals are all taxed at different effective rates in the policy equilibrium.
Furthermore, based on an initial equilibrium where both thin-capitalization and CFC
rules are set at interior levels, a reduction in the transaction costs for FDI tightens the
optimal thin-capitalization rule, because a higher level of inward FDI makes it more
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costly to allow internal debt to be deducted from the domestic tax base. At the same
time, the diminished home bias of multinationals reduces the need to tax discriminate
between home-based and foreign-based multinationals and thus leads to a laxer CFC rule
in the policy optimum. In contrast, reduced costs for debt shifting to the tax haven will
lead to a simultaneous tightening of both thin-capitalization rules and CFC rules. Both
of these measures increase the corporate tax base and prevent multinationals from taking
advantage of the lower costs of debt shifting to the tax haven.
Interpreting economic integration as a simultaneous reduction in the transaction costs
for FDI and in the costs of profit shifting, a clear-cut incentive emerges for countries
to tighten their thin-capitalization rules under economic integration, whereas the case
for tighter CFC rules is more mixed. These model results are consistent with the ob-
served policy changes over time, summarized in the last two columns of Table 1, that
thin-capitalization rules have been tightened in more countries, and relaxed in fewer, as
compared to CFC rules.
The existing literature on CFC rules is almost exclusively empirical.8 Ruf and We-
ichenrieder (2012, 2013) show for German-based multinationals that CFC rules are ef-
fective in curbing passive investment and have a strong impact on the decision of where
to locate internal banks and profit centers. Egger and Wamser (2015) focus instead on
the question of how CFC rules affect German multinationals’ real investment decisions,
using a regression discontinuity design at the thresholds where CFC rules become bind-
ing. They find a substantially negative local treatment effect on real investment around
the thresholds, implying that a binding CFC rule significantly increases effective capital
costs. The only studies on CFC rules not using German data are Altshuler and Hubbard
(2003) and Mutti and Grubert (2006). Altshuler and Hubbard (2003) show that tighter
U.S. CFC rules restricted tax deferral by U.S. multinationals. Mutti and Grubert (2006)
analyze the increased use of so-called ‘check-the-box’ rules, introduced in 1997, which
allow U.S. multinationals to work around the United States’ CFC rules.9
In comparison to CFC rules, thin-capitalization rules have received some more atten-
tion in the recent literature. From a theoretical perspective, Hong and Smart (2010) and
Haufler and Runkel (2012) show that thin-capitalization rules can be used as an instru-
ment to differentiate between the effective taxation of national and multinational firms.
8The only theoretical contribution of which we are aware is Weichenrieder (1996). He shows that
CFC rules increase capital costs and decrease the foreign investment of home-based multinationals. His
analysis does not endogenize CFC rules or other tax policies towards multinationals, however.
9‘Check-the-box’ rules give U.S.-based multinationals the option to create hybrid entities for tax
purposes. Affiliates in tax havens are then treated as resident companies by their host governments,
but are viewed as branches by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, thus rendering the U.S. CFC rules
ineffective. Blouin and Krull (2015) find that these ‘check the box’ regimes triggered a 6.4% reduction
in effective tax rates for U.S. multinationals, in particular benefitting their non-U.S. income.
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In a tax competition equilibrium, thin-capitalization rules will then be set inefficiently
lax, in order to attract investment by multinational firms. Mardan (2017) analytically
compares the effects of alternative thin-capitalization rules and shows that optimally set
thin-capitalization rules become stricter as the level of financial development increases.
From an empirical perspective, there is substantial evidence that thin-capitalization rules
are effective in restricting internal borrowing and debt shifting, but they also have neg-
ative effects on real investment activity. Examples of this literature are Overesch and
Wamser (2010), Bu¨ttner et al. (2012, 2016), and Blouin et al. (2014).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model
and derives the optimal financing and investment decisions of national and multinational
firms. Section 3 turns to the optimal tax policy choices made by each country’s govern-
ment. Section 4 analyzes the effects of lower transaction costs for FDI and lower costs
of profit shifting on the governments’ optimal mix of thin-capitalization and CFC rules.
Section 5 discusses several extensions of our main analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The basic framework
We set up a model of two countries, a home country labeled h and a foreign country
labeled f . Additionally, there exists a continuum of tax-haven countries offering preferen-
tial effective tax rates tk, which are continuously distributed in the range [0, 1). Capital is
perfectly mobile across countries and countries h and f are small in world capital markets
so that the rate of return to capital is fixed at r > 0.
There are two representative multinational companies (henceforth MNCs), one head-
quartered in each of countries h and f . Each MNC has a producing affiliate in both
countries h and f , and a financial center in one of the tax-haven countries. We assume
that all affiliates are fully owned by the parent company.10 While the MNC’s producing
subsidiaries are tied to the countries h and f , the MNC is completely flexible in choosing
the tax haven in which it places its internal bank, and it can costlessly move from one
tax haven to another in order to minimize its overall tax payment. While the assump-
tion of zero relocation costs between tax havens is clearly a simplification, the physical
presence of MNCs in tax-haven countries is typically minimized. The relocation costs for
the MNC’s internal bank can therefore be expected to be very low, in contrast to the
10For an analysis of debt shifting in the presence of variable ownership structures, see Schindler and
Schjelderup (2012).
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relocation costs that would arise for the MNC’s producing affiliates.
Furthermore, there is also one representative purely national firm in each country h
and f . The division between national firms and MNCs is exogenous to our analysis, arising
for example from differential fixed costs of setting up an ‘internationalized’ organizational
structure.11
All firms use capital to produce a homogeneous output good that is sold in the world
market at a price normalized to one. The good is produced with capital and some fixed
factor, leading to a production function with positive but decreasing returns to invest-
ment. Production technologies are allowed to differ between national firms and MNCs,
but are the same for all affiliates of MNCs. For the national firms, the capital use is
denoted by di, with i ∈ {h, f}, and production is given by g(di). For the MNCs, capital
use is kji , where the superscript j denotes the ownership country (the country where the
headquarters reside) and the subscript i indicates the country where capital is employed.
Production by affiliates of the MNCs is given by f(kji ).
For simplicity, our analysis ignores external capital markets and assumes that all firms
can raise sufficient equity to finance their optimal investment levels. MNCs can, however,
place their equity in the tax-haven affiliate, which then becomes an internal bank and
grants internal loans to the affiliates in countries h and f . This generates interest income
in the tax haven but deductible interest expenses in countries h and f , in total leading
to aggregate tax savings for the MNC.12 Our analysis thus focuses on these tax-related
internal borrowing decisions, which empirically are one of the main channels by which
profits are transferred from high-tax to low-tax countries (see Egger et al., 2014, for recent
evidence). In this context, we ask under which conditions CFC rules are employed to
supplement thin-capitalization rules, which are the primary policy instrument to address
debt shifting in MNCs.13
The governments of countries i, j ∈ {h, f} can deploy three different tax instruments,
in order to simultaneously attract FDI and minimize the tax revenue losses from profit
shifting. These are (i) the statutory corporate tax rate ti; (ii) a thin-capitalization rule
11This follows most of the literature on discriminatory tax competition, which assumes exogenous
differences in the international mobility of capital tax bases. For an analysis that endogenizes the degree
of international firm mobility, see Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008).
12In our setting, internal debt is therefore used exclusively in order to save taxes. For an analysis where
internal debt also serves to overcome capital market imperfections, see Mardan (2017).
13A different channel by which MNCs shift profits to low-tax countries is through transfer pricing.
The primary instrument to address this form of profit shifting is the enforcement of the arm’s length
principle. As arms-length taxation will generally not be able to eliminate all profit shifting, however (see,
e.g., Keuschnigg and Devereux, 2013), it may also have to be supplemented by CFC legislation. In such
a setting, we would expect that CFC rules are part of the optimal policy mix under conditions that are
very similar to the ones derived here.
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limiting the deductibility of interest to a ‘safe-harbor’ debt-to-asset ratio λi; and (iii) a
CFC rule that taxes the MNC’s passive income in the headquarters country j whenever
the tax rate for the MNC’s internal bank (i.e., the tax rate tk of the chosen tax haven)
falls below a minimum threshold τ j.
More specifically, the thin-capitalization rule permits all MNCs investing in a host
country i to shift internal interest payments to the affiliate in the tax haven up to a safe-
harbor ratio 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 of (internal) debt to capital employed (see footnote 3). As long as
this safe-harbor ratio is not exceeded, we assume that the internal loan transaction with
the tax-haven affiliate is not associated with any transaction costs for the firm. Hence,
given the tax savings, affiliates will always find it optimal to engage in internal lending
until the safe-harbor share λi of internal interest payments is exhausted.
If financial leverage exceeds the safe-harbor ratio, tax deductibility on ‘excessive’ in-
terest expenses would be denied by the thin-capitalization rule. However, MNCs typically
have additional ways to ‘stretch’ existing thin-capitalization rules, for example by utiliz-
ing holding structures for which higher leverage ratios are permitted (Weichenrieder and
Windischbauer, 2008). Another option is to misdeclare internal debt as external debt,
which is fully deductible under most thin-capitalization rules, and to disguise the own-
ership in the internal bank.14 Such restructuring will, however, cause additional costs for
the MNC, which we call ‘concealment costs’ in the following. Hence, in excess of the safe-
harbor share of internal debt λi that is covered by the thin-capitalization rule, affiliates
will be able to deduct a further, endogenous share βji of their capital costs in the host
country by means of internal debt shifting to a tax haven. Therefore, a MNC based in
country j and investing in country i realizes a total amount of (gross) tax savings in
country i equal to tir(λi + β
j
i )k
j
i by shifting debt to a tax haven.
CFC rules allow governments to limit these tax advantages that the home-based MNC
obtains from internal leverage. They reserve the right of tax authorities in the MNC’s
parent country to tax the profits of an affiliate in a tax haven by adding this affiliate’s
income (or a part of it) to the profits declared in the parent country.15 CFC rules apply
when the affiliate in the tax haven is only lightly taxed, and when its primary activity
is to provide debt or patent services to other affiliates in the same corporate group, that
is when it generates so-called passive income. Typically, CFC rules stipulate a minimum
14See Ruf and Schindler (2015), sections 2.1 and 3.1 for a detailed discussion of these strategies. In line
with these arguments, empirical studies indicate that many MNCs are able to deduct interest payments
in excess of the limitations imposed by thin-capitalization rules; see, e.g., Blouin et al. (2014).
15CFC rules come in two different variants. Under the “tainted income approach” only the passive
income of the low-tax affiliate is added to the tax base of the parent company. Under the “pro-rata
approach” both passive and active income of the low-tax affiliate is added to the parent’s tax base, but
only in proportion to the parent’s ownership share. In our model these two approaches coincide, because
the tax-haven affiliate earns only passive income, and it is fully owned by the parent company.
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effective tax rate τ j that must be levied in a host country, in order to avoid additional
taxation in the parent country. This instrument applies to both the internal debt within
the limit of the legally stipulated thin-capitalization rule λi, and to the firm’s optimal
level of ‘excess’ leverage βji .
Under our assumptions that an infinite number of tax havens with varying tax rates
exists, and that the MNC can costlessly switch between them, the MNC will always
locate its internal bank in a tax-haven country k whose statutory tax rate tk is equal
to the lowest possible tax rate τ j that just avoids the CFC rules of its home country j.
Hence, the tax rate τ j, specified in the CFC rule, will also be the tax rate that the MNC
pays, in equilibrium, in the tax-haven country. In the presence of a binding CFC rule, the
(net) tax gain from debt shifting for a MNC affiliate based in country j and investing in
country i is thus reduced to (ti − τ j)r(λi + βji )kji .
The statutory tax rate, the thin-capitalization, and the CFC rule then jointly affect
two decision margins of the MNC: (i) the investment levels in each of the countries h and
f ; and (ii) the use of internal debt in financing its producing affiliates.
2.2 Firms’ decision problems
National firms. Unlike MNCs, purely national firms do not have the opportunity to
use internal debt as a tax-planning instrument. The cost of capital r can not be deducted
from the tax base, and hence, the corporate tax combines a tax on profits with a ‘pure’
capital tax. The optimization problem of the national firms reduces to the decision on
the investment level d. Profits of the national firms are
pidi = (1− ti)g(di)− rdi. (1)
The optimal investment level is then implicitly defined by the first-order condition
(1− ti)g′(di) = r. (2)
A higher statutory tax rate ti affects the investment levels of national firms by
∂di
∂ti
=
g′(di)
(1− th)g′′(di) < 0 ∀ i ∈ {h, f}. (3)
Since the costs of financing the investment are not tax-deductible for national firms, but
the returns from the investment are taxed, a higher statutory tax rate induces national
firms to reduce their investment levels. The governments’ remaining tax instruments do
not affect national firms.
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Multinational firms. Under the ruling international standard of separate accounting,
profits are considered separately for each entity of a MNC. For a MNC that is headquar-
tered in country j and has an affiliate in country i, affiliates’ net profits are
piji = (1− ti)f(kji )− ρjikji − 1skji , (4)
where ρji are the effective capital costs of the affiliate, which are derived below. The
indicator variable 1 takes on the value of unity if i 6= j and zero otherwise, implying
that FDI causes additional transaction costs s per unit of capital invested. These costs
incorporate additional information costs, or monitoring costs that are higher when the
manager’s division is geographically separated from the firm’s headquarters (Grossman
and Helpman, 2004).16 This gives rise to a ‘home bias’ in our model where, in equilibrium,
the home affiliate of the home-based MNC chooses a higher investment level than the
home affiliate of the foreign-based MNC.
The MNC’s capital costs in a host country i are reduced by the tax deductibility of
internal debt. As decribed above, the net tax gain per unit of internal debt in the presence
of a binding CFC rule imposed by the MNC’s parent country j is (ti− τ j)r. The amount
of internal debt that is shifted to the tax haven depends on the share of internal debt λi
that is tax-deductible under the thin-capitalization rule, and on the excess leverage βji .
The latter, however, causes concealment costs that reduce the net gain from the extra
leverage and increase the capital cost. Concealment costs are assumed to be a linear
function of the capital costs and a convex function of the extra leverage share βji and are
given by Cji = (δ/n)(β
j
i )
nrkji , where n > 1. With these specifications, the capital costs of
an affiliate of MNC j in country i per unit of investment kji are
17
ρji =
[
1− (ti − τ j)(λi + βji ) +
δ
n
(βji )
n
]
r. (5)
Since the capital costs do not depend on the investment level, we can solve the MNC’s
maximization problem sequentially. We first derive the MNC’s profit-maximizing financial
structure and then turn to the MNC’s decision on how much to invest and produce in each
country, given the minimized capital cost. The MNC’s optimal leverage ratio is obtained
16Introducing transaction costs for FDI is consistent with empirical evidence showing that FDI is
falling in the distance between the home and the foreign affiliate of MNCs (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004;
Kleinert and Toubal, 2010).
17From eq. (5), we see that the investment costs of an affiliate in country i would be fully tax-deductible,
leading to effective capital costs of ρji = (1− ti)r, if the headquarters country allowed the internal bank
to be placed in a tax haven with a zero tax rate (τ j = 0) and if there is no binding thin-capitalization
rule so that λi = 1. In this case, the affiliate would not have an incentive to use any extra leverage
(βji = 0) and consequently would not incur any concealment costs.
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by differentiating the effective capital cost in eq. (5) with respect to βji , giving
βji =
(
ti − τ j
δ
) 1
(n−1)
. (6)
From eq. (6), the effects of the host country’s corporate tax rate and the headquarters
country’s CFC rule on the affiliate’s optimal leverage ratio are
∂βji
∂ti
=
1
(n− 1)
[
(ti − τ j)2−n
δ
] 1
(n−1)
> 0,
∂βji
∂τ j
= −∂β
j
i
∂ti
< 0. (7)
The response of βji to changes in the tax parameters ti and τ
j is best seen when considering
the special case of n = 2. In this case the derivative simplifies to ∂βji /∂ti = 1/δ and the
response of the excess leverage to changes in the net tax gain factor (ti − τ j) is simply
given by the inverse of the concealment cost parameter δ.
Using eq. (6) in (5) gives the effective capital cost under the optimized financial
structure:
(ρji )
∗ =
{
1− (ti − τ j)λi − (n− 1)
n
[
(ti − τ j)n
δ
] 1
n−1
}
r. (8)
From eq. (8), we can derive the effects of all tax instruments on the effective capital costs
of each affiliate. In country h, three different entities of MNCs need to be considered:
the home affiliate of the home-based MNC, the home affiliate of the foreign-based MNC,
and the foreign affiliate of the home-based MNC. The effect of the home country’s tax
parameters th, λh and τ
h on these three firm types are
∂ρhh
∂th
= −(λh + βhh)r,
∂ρhh
∂λh
= −(th − τh)r, ∂ρ
h
h
∂τh
= (λh + β
h
h)r; (9a)
∂ρfh
∂th
= −(λh + βfh)r,
∂ρfh
∂λh
= −(th − τ f )r, ∂ρ
f
h
∂τh
= 0; (9b)
∂ρhf
∂th
= 0,
∂ρhf
∂λh
= 0,
∂ρhf
∂τh
= (λf + β
h
f )r. (9c)
Turning first to the effects on the home-based MNC’s home affiliate in eq. (9a), we
see that an increase in country h’s statutory tax rate lowers the effective capital costs,
because it increases the value of deducting (internal) debt from the corporate tax base.
Similarly, a more lenient thin-capitalization rule reduces the cost of capital by decreasing
the corporate tax base. Finally, an increase in τh, which implies a tightened CFC rule,
decreases the gains from debt shifting and therefore raises the effective capital costs.
Equation (9b) shows the tax effects on the foreign-based MNC’s affiliate in the home
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country h. Changes in h’s statutory tax rate th and in the thin-capitalization rule λh affect
the capital costs of the foreign-based MNC in a way analogous to the home-based MNC
[see eq. (9a)]. However, the foreign-based MNC is not affected by a change in country h’s
CFC rule τh. Finally, the tax effects on the home-based MNC’s affiliate in the foreign
country f are given in eq. (9c). This shows that neither the statutory tax rate th nor the
thin-capitalization rule λh affect the capital costs of this affiliate. However, country h’s
CFC rule applies to the home-based MNC’s affiliate in the foreign country. Thus, an
increase in τh increases the effective capital costs of this affiliate.
We now turn to the MNCs’ investment decisions, given the optimized financial struc-
ture. Maximizing profits in eq. (4) implicitly determines optimal investment by
(1− ti)f ′(kji )− ρji − 1s = 0 ∀ i, j = h, f. (10)
An increase in the effective capital costs ρji decreases investment by
∂kji
∂ρji
=
1
(1− ti)f ′′(kji )
< 0 ∀ i, j = h, f. (11)
Note here that the per-unit transaction cost s does not affect the sensitivity with which
the MNC’s investment responds to changes in the cost of capital.
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first-order condition (10) and using
eqs. (9a)–(9c) delivers the effects of the home country’s statutory tax rate th on the
investment decision of each MNC:
∂kjh
∂th
=
f ′(kjh)− (λh + βjh)
(1− th)f ′′(kjh)
< 0, j = h, f ;
∂khf
∂th
= 0. (12)
Similar to purely national firms, the statutory tax rate th negatively affects investment
levels for all affiliates located in country h, because not all costs of capital can be deducted.
However, the investment of the foreign affiliate of the home-based MNC is not affected by
the home country’s statutory tax rate. The investment effects of the other tax instruments
(λh and τ
h) result from their effects on the capital costs of different MNC entities given
in (9a)–(9c), in combination with the negative effect of (firm-specific) capital costs on
investment levels in (11).
Finally, from condition (10), a rise in the transaction costs of FDI changes the invest-
ment levels of the home-based and foreign-based MNCs by
∂kji
∂s
=
1
(1− ti)f ′′(kji )
< 0, i 6= j, ∂k
i
i
∂s
= 0. (13)
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Larger transaction costs reduce the foreign-based MNC’s investment incentives and hence
inward FDI, but do not affect investment by the home-based MNC. Therefore, they result
in an increased ‘home bias’. Moreover, since home and foreign affiliates respond in the
same way to changes in capital costs ρ [eq. (11)], the lower investment level of the foreign-
owned affiliate implies that the elasticity with which this affiliate responds to a change
in its effective capital cost exceeds that of the home affiliate of the home-based MNC.
3 Optimal tax policy
In our general model, we define welfare in country h as a weighted average of domestic
tax revenue and the sum of the profits of national firms and the home-based MNC.18
Thus,
Wh = th · Th + γ · Πh, (14)
where Th is the total tax base in the home country, Π
h = pid + pi
h
h + pi
h
f are the total
profits of firms headquartered in h, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the relative welfare weight placed
on domestically owned firms’ profits. The welfare discount on firms’ profits either reflects
the fact that raising corporate tax revenue is important for society (for redistributive
reasons, or to reduce other distortive taxes), or that domestic firms are partly owned
by third-country investors that do not enter the domestic welfare function. For γ = 0,
we would have a Leviathan government that is solely interested in maximizing its tax
revenue.
The domestic tax base Th is given by the sales of all entities producing in country h,
less the permitted deduction of internal debt for the home affiliates of the home-based
and foreign-based MNCs:
Th = g(dh) + f(k
h
h)− (λh + βhh)rkhh + f(kfh)− (λh + βfh)rkfh. (15)
The home government (and analogously the foreign government) maximizes national
welfare in eq. (14) by choosing the statutory tax rate th, the thin-capitalization rule λh
and the CFC rule τh, subject to the optimal financing and investment decisions of the
different firm types discussed in the previous section.
Optimal statutory tax rate. All firm types in country h are affected by changes in
its statutory tax rate. Differentiating the welfare function with respect to th implicitly
18Note that consumers in the home country are not affected by tax policy in our model, because the
price of the single output good is determined in the large world market.
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determines the optimal statutory tax rate:
∂Wh
∂th
= (1− γ) [g (dh) + f(khh)− (λh + βhh)rkhh]+ [f(kfh)− (λh + βfh)rkfh]
+ th
{
g′(dh)
∂dh
∂th
+
[
f ′
(
khh
)− (λh + βhh)r] ∂khh∂th +
[
f ′(kfh)− (λh + βfh)r
] ∂kfh
∂th
}
− thr
(
∂βhh
∂th
khh +
∂βfh
∂th
kfh
)
= 0. (16)
The first-order condition (16) states that raising the statutory tax rate th increases welfare
in country h due to the net gain (1−γ) from taxing domestic profits (the first term on the
right-hand side) and from the taxation of the foreign-based MNC’s profits (the second
term). However, a higher statutory tax rate also reduces the domestic tax base, and hence
tax revenues, as a result of lower investments by all firms that operate in the home market
(the third term). Finally, the tax base of the home country is further reduced because
all affiliates of MNCs operating in country h have an incentive to increase the variable
internal debt level βji (the fourth term).
Evaluating condition (16) at th = 0 shows that the negative third and fourth terms
vanish at this point, and hence ∂Wh/∂th is unambiguously positive at th = 0. Therefore,
the statutory tax rate will always be positive in the government’s tax optimum, t∗h > 0.
Optimal thin-capitalization rule. For any statutory tax rate th > 0, the introduction
of a thin-capitalization rule λh > 0 (i.e., granting some tax deductibility of internal debt)
reduces the tax base of the MNCs, but it does not affect purely national firms. Thus, the
thin-capitalization rule allows governments to tax discriminate between purely national
firms and MNCs. Differentiating the welfare function (14) with respect to λh leads to
∂Wh
∂λh
= th
{[
f ′(khh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
+
[
f ′(kfh)− (λh + βfh)r
] ∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
}
− thr
(
khh + k
f
h
)
− γkhh
∂ρhh
∂λh
≤ 0. (17)
The first term on the right-hand side of the first-order condition (17) is positive, as an
increase in λh reduces the effective capital costs and thus induces the home affiliates of the
home-based and foreign-based MNCs to expand their investment in the home country [see
eq. (11)]. The second term is negative, however, as a more generous thin-capitalization
rule allows MNCs to deduct a higher share of their financing costs from the corporate tax
base. Finally, the third term is positive again, as a reduction in its capital costs increases
the profits of the home-based MNC’s home affiliate.
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In sum, the optimal thin-capitalization rule balances the gains from increased invest-
ment by MNCs against the net welfare cost of a reduced tax base. To obtain a strictly
positive deductibility of internal debt λ∗h > 0 in the optimum, the investment by MNCs
in country h must be sufficiently responsive to tax incentives, i.e., ∂kjh/∂ρ
h
h, j ∈ {h, f}
must be sufficiently large.19 If this is the case, the government will find it optimal to
tax discriminate in favor of MNCs vis-a`-vis purely national firms by selectively narrow-
ing the tax base for the former group. Moreover, the thin-capitalization rule will be the
more generous (λh is higher), the higher is the welfare weight of firms’ profits (γ) in the
government’s objective function. We summarize in:
Proposition 1 In the tax optimum, the government will tax discriminate between na-
tional firms and MNCs by setting a thin-capitalization rule that allows a positive de-
ductibility of internal debt (λh > 0), if MNCs’ investments react sensitively to the reduc-
tion in effective capital costs.
Note that we have imposed the restriction on governments that thin-capitalization
rules must be identical for home-based and foreign-based MNCs (see footnote 3). Con-
ceptually, however, we can separate the effects that the thin-capitalization rule has on the
home-based and the foreign-based MNC, respectively. Assuming that λh is positive in the
policy optimum (cf. Proposition 1), we can then rewrite condition (17) as ∆h + ∆f = 0,
where we define:
∆h ≡ [f ′(khh)− (λh + βhh)r] ∂khh∂ρhh ∂ρ
h
h
∂λh
− rkhh − γ
khh
th
∂ρhh
∂λh
, (18a)
∆f ≡
[
f ′(kfh)− (λh + βfh)r
] ∂kfh
∂ρfh
∂ρfh
∂λh
− rkfh. (18b)
With symmetry (i.e., τh = τ f ) and in the presence of transaction costs s > 0, the positive
first term is unambiguously larger in eq. (18b) as compared to eq. (18a). This follows from
the presence of a ‘home bias’ (kfh < k
h
h) and the concavity of the production function,
which implies a larger marginal return to investment for the foreign-based MNC. At the
same time, the investment sensitivity with respect to a change in the capital cost is the
same for the two MNCs [see eq. (11)]. Moreover, since investment is lower for the foreign-
based MNC, the negative second term in eq. (18b) is smaller than in eq. (18a). Together
these two terms capture the fact that the elasticity of investment with respect to changes
in capital costs is larger for the foreign-based than for the home-based MNC. Therefore,
if differentiated thin-capitalization rules were permitted, the home country could attract
19See Haufler and Runkel (2012, Proposition 2) for a similar condition in a setting with thin-
capitalization rules only.
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inward FDI more efficiently by setting a more lenient thin-capitalization rule (a higher
level of λh) for the foreign-based MNC, provided that the welfare weight of domestic
profits [the positive last term in eq. (18a)] is sufficiently low. Indeed, such a discriminatory
thin-capitalization policy would always be optimal for a Leviathan government (γ = 0).
In this case, a common thin-capitalization rule will thus imply a higher level of λh
than would be optimal for the home-based MNC only, but a lower level of λh than would
be optimal for the foreign-based MNC. Evaluating the two shadow values in eqs. (18a)
and (18b) at a common thin-capitalization rule for both MNCs must then yield ∆h <
0 < ∆f . We will use this result in our interpretation of the optimal CFC rule, to which
we turn now.
Optimal CFC rule. The CFC rule reduces the net tax gain from internal debt by
increasing the tax rate in the MNC’s internal bank. Consequently, such a rule not only
raises the cost of capital for the home affiliate but also for the foreign affiliate of the
home-based MNC and thus deters outward FDI. Therefore, the question arises as to why
the government should use a CFC rule alongside an optimized thin-capitalization rule.
Differentiating the welfare function (14) with respect to τh results in
∂Wh
∂τh
= −th ∂β
h
h
∂τh
rkhh + th
[
f ′(khh)− (λh + βhh)r
] ∂khh
∂ρhh
∂ρhh
∂τh
− γ [khh (λh + βhh)+ khf (λf + βhf )] r ≤ 0. (19)
The first term on the right-hand side is positive, showing that a tighter CFC rule increases
tax revenues in the home country by reducing the extra leverage βhh that the home affiliate
of the home-based MNC chooses in its financial optimum. In contrast, the second term
is negative, because a tighter CFC rule increases the effective capital costs of the home-
based MNC’s home affiliate and this reduces investment and tax revenues. Finally, the
third term is also negative as all affiliates of the home-based MNC lose profits due to
their higher costs of capital.
The first-order condition for the CFC rule can be linked to our previous discussion
that the government would like to tax discriminate between foreign-based and home-
based MNCs. Using the optimal thin-capitalization rule in an interior optimum [eqs. (17)
and (18b)] along with eqs. (9a)–(9c), the first-order condition for the CFC rule in (19)
can be rewritten as
thrk
h
h
[(
−∂β
h
h
∂τh
)
− (λh + β
h
h)
(th − τh)
]
+ th∆
f (λh + β
h
h)
(th − τh) − γk
h
f (λf + β
h
f )r ≤ 0. (20)
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The first term in eq. (20) combines the positive effect of a tighter CFC rule on the
home country’s tax base with the negative effect that results from the lower investment
incentives for the home-based MNC. This term is more likely to be positive, on net, if the
home-based MNC’s excess leverage responds elastically to changed tax gains from placing
its internal bank in a tax haven. As we have discussed above [eq. (7)], this elasticity will
be the larger, the smaller is the MNC’s cost (δ) of concealing excess leverage from tax
authorities. The second term is positive in the presence of a sufficiently strong ‘home
bias’, which implies ∆f > 0 from our discussion of eqs. (18a)–(18b). Thus, besides the
motive to curb profit shifting, the home government’s incentive to implement a binding
CFC rule also arises from the motive to tax discriminate between foreign-based and
home-based MNCs. This can be achieved by means of the CFC rule, because this rule
increases the effective capital cost of the home-based, but not of the foreign-based MNC.
The more pronounced is the ‘home bias’, and hence the larger is ∆f , the more likely is the
government to implement a binding CFC rule. Finally, the intuition for the negative third
term is the same as in condition (17), because a higher weight on the home-based MNC’s
profits earned abroad reduces the incentive to set a strict CFC rule. We summarize in:
Proposition 2 In the tax optimum, the government is more likely to set a binding CFC
rule (τh > 0), if (i) the home-based MNC’s financing structure responds elastically to the
increase in capital costs; (ii) transaction costs for FDI are high and the CFC rule serves
as an instrument to tax discriminate between home-based and foreign-based MNCs; (iii)
the welfare weight on profits in the government’s objective function is low.
Condition (i) in Proposition 2 is supported by recent empirical evidence from Egger et
al. (2014), which indicates that debt shifting in MNCs responds highly elastically to tax
incentives. For a panel of German-owned MNCs, the authors find that a one percentage
point increase in the host country’s tax rate raises the internal-debt-to-capital ratio of
the borrowing affiliate by 0.92 percentage points.
Condition (ii) indicates that CFC rules are less likely to be part of an optimal tax
system when transaction costs for FDI fall and the need to differentiate between the
effective taxation of home-based and foreign-based MNCs is therefore reduced. This could
explain, for example, why the United States have weakened their existing CFC rules
(‘subpart F rules’) by introducing the ‘check-the-box’ regime (see footnote 9). The relative
importance of the capital stock from inward FDI (kfh) has significantly increased in the
United States during the last three decades, indicating falling transaction costs for FDI.20
20The FDI inward capital stock, as a percentage of GDP, has roughly tripled in the United States
since 1990 (UNCTAD 2016, Annex Table 7). In contrast, the total capital stock, as a share of GDP, has
remained roughly constant.
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From eq. (18b), this reduces ∆f and hence the incentive to use CFC rules as a way to
increase the taxation of home-based vis-a`-vis foreign-based MNCs.
Condition (iii) reinforces this argument when, for a positive welfare weight γ > 0,
foreign investment and hence the foreign-earned profits of home-based MNC’s increase.
Grubert (2012) documents, for a sample of more than 750 U.S.-owned MNCs, that their
average pre-tax share of profits earned abroad has increased from 37 percent in 1996 to 51
percent in 2004. Recall that a binding CFC rule reduces the profits of all affiliates of the
home-based MNC, but additional domestic tax revenue is collected only from the affiliate
in the home country. Therefore, as the profit share of foreign affiliates increases, a CFC
rule becomes relatively less attractive from the perspective of the MNC’s parent country.
Accordingly, condition (iii) can also potentially explain why the U.S. government has
relaxed its existing CFC rules by means of check-the-box provisions.
Putting Propositions 1 and 2 together, the optimal thin-capitalization rule discrimi-
nates between purely national firms’ and MNCs’ investment, whereas the optimal CFC
rule introduces a second tax discrimination between the investments of home-based and
foreign-based MNCs. In the following, we assume that the home and the foreign coun-
tries set interior values of both λi and τ
j in their policy optimum. Table 1 reveals that
many countries do indeed simultaneously employ binding CFC rules and binding thin-
capitalization rules. Starting from such an interior optimum, we then analyze how reduced
transaction costs for FDI on the one hand, and reduced costs for profit shifting on the
other, affect the optimal mix of countries’ tax policies vis-a`-vis MNCs.
4 Increased mobility of FDI and financial flows
Our model incorporates two exogenous parameters that can be utilized to capture two
major changes in economic conditions that have occurred in recent decades. A first devel-
opment is the strong increase in FDI. Worldwide, the inward stock of FDI, as a percentage
of GDP, has more than tripled in the last 25 years, from less than 10% in 1990 to more
than 33% in 2015 (UNCTAD 2016, Annex Table 7). This development is captured in our
model by a fall in the transaction cost parameter for FDI, denoted by s, which corre-
sponds to a reduction in the ‘home bias’ of MNCs’ investments. In the following we will
label a reduction in s as ‘increased mobility of FDI’.
A second important development is that MNCs shift an increasing share of their
profits to tax havens, in order to minimize their overall tax payments. Zucman (2014),
for example, documents that 20% of the total profits of U.S. firms accrued in tax havens
in 2014, representing a tenfold increase since the 1980s. In our model, this is captured
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by a fall in the concealment cost parameter δ, which characterizes the ease with which
MNCs can build up excess leverage and shift interest payments to their preferred tax
haven. A reduction in δ is termed ‘increased financial mobility’ in what follows.
To analytically determine the comparative-static effects of changes in s and δ on the
simultaneous choices of the thin-capitalization rule λh and the CFC rule τ
h, we need
to make some simplifying assumptions. First, we focus on a Leviathan government that
maximizes tax revenues only, and thus set the weight of firms’ profits in the government’s
objective (14) at γ = 0. Moreover, we assume that countries h and f are fully symmetric
and treat f ′′(k) as a constant. Finally, we fix the statutory tax rate th in our analytical
derivations and focus only on the two endogenous tax-base parameters λh and τ
h.21
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions for λh and τ
h in (17) and (19) leads
to: [
α1 α2
α3 α4
][
dλh
dτh
]
=
[
α5
0
]
ds+
[
α6
α7
]
dδ, where (21)
α1 =
∂2W h
∂(λh)2
< 0, α2 =
∂2W h
∂λh∂τh
=
∂2W h
∂τh∂λh
= α3 > 0, α4 =
∂2W h
∂(τh)2
< 0,
α5 =
∂2W h
∂λh∂s
< 0, α6 =
∂2W h
∂λh∂δ
< 0, α7 =
∂2W h
∂τh∂δ
> 0. (22)
The terms α1 to α7 are derived and signed in eqs. (A.1) and (A.4) in Appendix A, under
the condition that FDI transaction costs s are not too large in the initial equilibrium.22
Increased mobility of FDI. We start by analyzing how a change in the FDI trans-
action cost parameter s affects the equilibrium policies. Applying Cramer’s rule to the
equation system (21) and using the signed terms in (22), we immediately arrive at
dλh
ds
=
α4α5
|A| > 0;
dτh
ds
= −α3α5|A| > 0, (23)
where |A| = α1α4 − α2α3 > 0 must hold to obtain a local maximum (see the appendix).
Hence a reduction in the transaction costs for FDI leads to a tighter thin-capitalization
rule (a fall in λh), but also to a less strict CFC rule (a fall in τ
h) in the government’s
policy optimum. The intuition for the change in the optimal thin-capitalization rule is
as follows. The fall in the FDI cost parameter s increases the level of inward FDI from
eq. (13). Thus, it increases the fiscal cost for the home government of granting a generous
21These simplifying assumptions are relaxed again in the extensions analyzed in Section 5.
22The appendix also shows that an interior solution for τh in our setting requires that the concealment
cost function is not too convex and 1 < n < 2.
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deductibility of interest to the home affiliate of the foreign-based MNC by means of a
high level of λh. At the same time, the fall in s does not change the investment response
of this affiliate to its capital costs ρfh [see eq. (11)] and therefore does not change the
‘benefits’ for the home country of granting a higher deductibility of internal debt. In
sum, this gives each government an incentive to tighten its thin-capitalization rule when
transaction costs for FDI fall.
At the same time, a reduction in the ‘home bias’ of MNCs’ investments reduces the
incentive for governments to tax discriminate between home-based and foreign-based
MNCs; i.e., it reduces the value of ∆f in the second term of (20).23 This implies that,
given the optimal adjustment of λh, there is less need to selectively increase the effective
tax rate for the home-based MNC by means of CFC regulation. At the same time, reduced
FDI costs have no direct effect on the sensitivity with which financial flows respond to
tax incentives and therefore do not affect the first term in (20). Hence, it will be optimal
for each country to relax its CFC rule by lowering τh. We summarize these findings in:
Proposition 3 Increased mobility of FDI (a fall in s) leads to stricter thin-capitalization
rules (λh falls) and to laxer CFC rules (τ
h falls), if governments maximize tax revenues
and the transaction cost parameter s is sufficiently low initially.
Increased financial mobility. The effects of a change in the income shifting cost
parameter δ are more involved, because this parameter directly affects the first-order
conditions of both optimal policy instruments λh and τ
h. In Appendix A [eqs. (A.7)
and (A.9)], we show that
dλh
dδ
=
α4α6 − α2α7
|A| > 0,
dτh
dδ
=
α1α7 − α3α6
|A| < 0, (24)
where |A| > 0 as before.
Consequently, falling costs of income shifting lead to both a tighter thin-capitalization
rule (λh falls) and a tighter CFC rule (τ
h rises). The direct effect on the optimal CFC
rule in eq. (20) is straightforward. A lower level of δ will increase the excess leverage ratio
β for any given set of optimal policies, implying that a tightening of the CFC rule will
have a larger beneficial effect on tax revenues [see eq. (7)]. Accordingly, the first term
in (20) becomes larger (and more likely to be positive) when δ is reduced. In contrast,
the motive to tax discriminate between the home-based and the foreign-based MNCs [the
23Recall from our discussion of (18b) that ∆f > 0 always holds when the home-based MNC’s profits
do not enter the government objective function (γ = 0). This is what we assume here.
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second term in (20)] is not directly affected by a change in δ. In sum, the net benefit from
tightening the CFC rule is increased and τh accordingly rises by the direct effect.
Turning to the optimal thin-capitalization rule, the rise in β following a reduction
in the parameter δ implies that the positive first term in the first-order condition (17)
becomes smaller. Intuitively, if β is increased, there is less additional revenue to be gained
from a given increase in investment that is induced by a more generous thin-capitalization
rule. At the same time, the negative effect on the domestic tax base caused by a more
generous thin-capitalization rule [the second term in (17)] is unchanged. Therefore, the
direct effect of a fall in δ calls for a tightening of the thin-capitalization rule.
The complication in signing the total effects in (24) arises from the fact that the
tightening of each policy instrument λh and τ
h leads to an indirect effect that tends to
work in the opposite direction. For example, if a tighter thin-capitalization rule is in place,
then a tightening of the CFC rule has a stronger negative effect on the investment of the
home-based MNC and this indirect effect tends to work in the direction of reducing τh.
As we show in the appendix [eqs. (A.7) and (A.9)], the direct effects dominate the indirect
effects for both policy instruments, if transaction costs s are sufficiently low initially, and
if the exponent n of the concealment cost function is sufficiently bound away from its
minimum value of 1. We can then summarize:
Proposition 4 Increased financial mobility (a fall in δ) leads to a stricter thin-capitali-
zation rule (λh falls) and to a stricter CFC rule (τ
h rises), if FDI mobility costs s are
small initially and if the concealment cost function is sufficiently convex (n >> 1).
Summarizing the results in Proposition 4, reduced costs of income shifting to the tax
haven imply a more aggressive tax planning by the MNC, resulting in a larger excess
leverage ratio β. Therefore, it is beneficial to tighten the thin-capitalization rule (i.e., to
reduce the safe-harbor ratio λ), in order to limit the total amount of debt shifting (λ+β)
to the tax haven. Moreover, the higher excess leverage β implies that the revenue gains
from employing a tighter CFC rule are increased. In the government’s optimum, the CFC
rule is thus tightened as well.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4, we can see that increased mobility of FDI and
increased financial mobility will both lead to stricter thin-capitalization rules in the gov-
ernment’s policy optimum whereas their effects on the optimal CFC rule are mutually
offsetting. Increased FDI mobility reduces the incentive to set a strict CFC rule, because
of the lower incentive to tax discriminate between home-based and foreign-based MNCs,
whereas higher financial mobility leads to stricter CFC rules, due to the increased profit
shifting opportunities. Since real-world developments in the past decades have included
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both a fall in the costs of FDI (a fall in s) and a fall in the cost of shifting debt to tax
havens (a fall in δ), we should thus expect to see an unambiguous tightening of thin-
capitalization rules, but a less clear picture regarding CFC rules among the countries
that do employ such restrictions on debt shifting.
Indeed, this pattern can be found in Table 1. From the 34 OECD countries in our
sample, 14 have tightened their thin-capitalization rules during the period 2000-2014 and
three more countries switched from a safe-harbor approach to earnings-stripping rules
in an attempt to tighten their thin-capitalization rules. During the same time period,
only one country (the Netherlands) has relaxed its thin-capitalization rule.24 In contrast,
CFC rules have been tightened in only eight countries in the sample, and they have
been relaxed in three countries (France, Hungary, Japan). Overall, the trend towards a
tightening of thin-capitalization rules has therefore been much more pronounced among
OECD countries than the trend towards a tightening of CFC rules.
5 Extensions
In this section, we analyze three extensions of our basic model. We first endogenize
the statutory tax rate and analyze numerically how the tax rate responds to increased
mobility of FDI and to increased financial mobility. We then ask whether the different tax
instruments are set too high or too low in the decentralized policy equilibrium, relative
to a Pareto efficient benchmark. Finally, we consider an asymmetric policy equilibrium
where one country gives a higher weight to domestic corporate profits in its objective
function than the other.
Endogenizing the statutory tax rate. A first extension of our analysis is to endog-
enize the statutory tax rates, which we have held fixed in our analysis of Section 4. It is
not possible to analytically derive the simultaneous effects of variations in the exogenous
parameters s and δ on the three endogenous variables t, λ, and τ . We can, however, deter-
mine these effects by means of numerical calculations. In Table 2, we present the results
of some illustrative simulations for the case where both countries h and f simultaneously
adjust their optimal tax policies to changes in the exogenous parameters of the model.
To interpret the simulation results in Table 2, we first turn to the effects of increased
FDI mobility in rows (1)–(3). We know from eq. (23) that a reduction in s tightens the
24This trend is even strengthened when the time horizon for the comparison is prolonged. Bu¨ttner et
al. (2012, p. 930) document that less than one-half of all OECD countries had thin-capitalization rules
in the mid-1990s, but two thirds of all OCED countries had enacted thin-capitalization rules by 2005.
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Table 2: Simulation results for increased mobility of FDI and financial flows
s δ λ τ t β ρ khh k
h
f t× T
Increased mobility of FDI: reduction in s
(1) 0.20 0.60 0.669 0.148 0.559 0.151 0.715 9.52 5.81 36.02
(2) 0.10 0.60 0.651 0.147 0.559 0.153 0.721 9.34 7.20 36.99
(3) 0.00 0.60 0.614 0.144 0.557 0.154 0.736 9.07 9.07 38.12
Increased financial mobility: reduction in δ
(4) 0.10 0.65 0.711 0.121 0.573 0.163 0.666 10.26 7.75 37.53
(5) 0.10 0.60 0.651 0.147 0.559 0.153 0.721 9.34 7.20 36.99
(6) 0.10 0.55 0.555 0.176 0.543 0.133 0.788 8.39 6.61 36.51
Note: Parameters held constant: r = 1, f(k) = 10k0.5, g(d) = 10d0.5, γ = 0, n = 1.2
thin-capitalization rule in the government’s optimum, but relaxes the CFC rule. These
mutually offsetting effects on the corporate tax base imply that the induced changes in
the optimal tax rate are small. Similarly, the incentives for firms to use excess leverage
β and the effects on MNCs’ cost of capital ρ are seen to be moderate. The main change
from increased FDI mobility is the alignment of home and foreign production (khh vs. k
h
f ).
Since the costs for FDI fall, this is associated with an overall increase in investment that
expands the corporate tax base and increases tax revenues (t× T ).
The effects of increased financial mobility are shown in rows (4)–(6) of Table 2. From
eq. (24), the fall in δ causes a simultaneous tightening of both the thin-capitalization
rule and the CFC rule. With a tax base that is unambiguously broadened, investment
of both home-based and foreign-based MNCs will respond more elastically to a change
in the domestic tax rate, causing the optimal statutory tax rate to fall.25 Interestingly,
the broadening of the corporate tax base may be so strong that the induced fall in the
statutory tax rate, in combination with the tighter CFC rule (the rise in τ), causes the
excess leverage β to fall in equilibrium. In our simulations, the shrinking tax gain of
shifting internal debt to a tax haven dominates the direct effect of the fall in δ and causes
the MNCs’ costs of capital ρ to rise. This reduces both home and foreign investment, as
well as overall tax revenues.
The tax competition equilibrium. Next, we consider a decentralized policy equi-
librium where each of the two symmetric countries chooses its set of policy measures
independently. We assume that an interior equilibrium is reached where the first-order
conditions (16), (17), and (19) are all met with equality. It then follows that, starting
from a decentralized policy equilibrium, the marginal effect of a change in country i’s
policy instrument on the joint welfare of the two regions equals the marginal effect on
25This corresponds to theoretical results in the literature on optimal thin-capitalization rules; see Hong
and Smart (2010) and Haufler and Runkel (2012).
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the welfare of country j (j 6= i). Using the governments’ objective (14) and the tax base
definition (15), it is straightforward to derive
∂Wf
∂th
= −γ
[
f(kfh)− (λh + βfh)kfhr
]
< 0; (25)
∂Wf
∂λh
= γkfh(th − τ f )r > 0; (26)
∂Wf
∂τh
= tf
{[
f ′(khf )− (λf + βhf )r
] ∂khf
∂ρhf
∂ρhf
∂τh
− ∂β
h
f
∂τh
khf r
}
. (27)
Equation (25) shows that the externalities arising from the statutory tax rate are negative
when there is a positive weight of corporate profits in the government objective function
(γ > 0). In this case, the statutory tax rate is too high in the decentralized tax equilibrium,
in comparison to the Pareto efficient benchmark. Intuitively, neither th nor λh affect the
cost of capital of country f ’s MNC, and hence do not impact tax revenues in country f .
However, each country taxes the profits of foreign-owned affiliates that operate within
its territory, leading to a transfer of resources from the (foreign) shareholders of the
foreign-based MNC to the domestic treasury.26 Similarly, equation (26) shows that the
thin-capitalization rule is too strict in the decentralized tax equilibrium. Again, this
implies a higher effective tax rate on foreign profits, relative to the efficient benchmark,
and hence a transfer of resources from foreign shareholders to the domestic government.
Finally, the marginal effect of τh in (27) is ambiguous, a priori. We can, however, use
the first-order condition (19) for τh to determine the sign of the net effect. If, for simplicity,
we ignore mobility costs of FDI (s = 0), then the two terms in (27) are identical to the
first two terms in (19). For γ > 0, the sum of the first two terms in (19) must then be
positive in an interior tax equilibrium. Hence, the sum of the terms in (27) must also be
positive, implying that the CFC rule is set too lax in the decentralized policy equilibrium
(τh is too low). Intuitively, each country allows its home-based MNC to partially escape
taxation in the foreign country by shifting profits to the tax haven, thus redistributing
income from the foreign treasury to the home-based MNC.
Notice that all these externalities disappear when governments maximize tax revenues
only and γ = 0 holds. In this case, it is immediate from (25) and (26) that the statutory
tax rate and the thin-capitalization rule are set at their globally efficient (i.e., tax revenue
maximizing) levels. Moreover, the sum of the terms in (27) is also zero in an interior
optimum if we assume, as before, that s = 0 and that (19) is met with equality. Intuitively,
a tighter CFC rule in country h reduces investment in country f , but it also reduces the
26This tax-the-foreigner effect is well-known from the literature; see, e.g., Huizinga and Nielsen (1997).
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Table 3: Simulation results for asymmetric countries
γh γf th tf λh λf τh τf
(1) 0.00 0.00 0.557 0.557 0.614 0.614 0.144 0.144
(2) 0.25 0.00 0.496 0.529 0.535 0.519 0.065 0.127
(3) 0.25 0.25 0.478 0.478 0.496 0.496 0.052 0.052
Note: Parameters held constant: r = 1, f(k) = 10k0.5, g(d) = 10d0.5, s = 0, δ = 0.6, n = 1.2
excess leverage βfh . These effects will just offset each other when we start from a symmetric
tax equilibrium without frictions for FDI.
Country asymmetries. Finally, we consider the effects of introducing an asymmetry
between the two countries. The most straightforward difference between countries is that
governments may put different valuations on the profits of home-owned firms, relative
to the collection of tax revenue. The simulation results for the case where the home
government has a higher valuation of domestic profits, γh > γf , are presented in Table 3.
As shown in row (2) of the table, the home country will then have a lower statutory tax
rate, a more lenient thin-capitalization rule (a higher level of λ), and a more lenient CFC
rule (a lower τ) in its tax optimum, relative to the foreign country.
It is straightforward to explain these effects from the first-order conditions for optimal
tax policies. The lower statutory tax rate in country h emerges from eq. (16), as a higher
level of γ reduces the positive first term, and hence the optimal statutory tax rate in
this country. In the first-order condition for the thin-capitalization rule, eq. (17), the
parameter γh enters the last term with a positive weight. This implies a higher level of
λh in the tax optimum, relative to λf . Finally, a more lenient CFC rule can be traced
back to the first-order condition (19), where the negative last term is rising in the profit
weight parameter γ, reducing τh in the tax optimum.
In row (3) of Table 3, the higher weight of profits in the governments’ welfare function
is extended to country f . The new, symmetric equilibrium features lower tax rates, tighter
thin-capitalization rules and more lenient CFC rules in both countries, relative to the case
where γh = γf = 0 [row (1)]. The higher weight of firm profits reduces optimal statutory
tax rates in both countries. Falling tax rates imply in turn that the investment responses
to a more generous thin-capitalization rule are now smaller, since fewer taxes can be saved
[see eq. (11)]. This effect tends to tighten thin-capitalization rules in both countries (λ
falls), relative to the case where γh = γf = 0. At the same time, CFC rules are relaxed in
both countries (τ falls). This results directly from the higher weight of firm profits, but
also because lower statutory tax rates reduce the equilibrium levels of β [see eq. (6)] and
thus reduce the revenue gains from tighter CFC legislation.
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6 Conclusions
Many governments have to cope with less tax revenue as multinational companies are
exploiting legal arbitrage opportunities in order to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax
countries. In response to this development, the OECD calls for introducing and strength-
ening CFC rules in its member countries in its ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting’ (OECD, 2013, 2015). Many governments have introduced such rules and the
recent empirical literature shows that financial and real decisions taken by multinational
companies are sensitive to changes in CFC rules. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far
neglected the analysis of CFC rules. In this paper, we aim to partially fill this gap by
explaining the role and the effects of CFC rules in international taxation.
Several implications can be drawn from our analysis. First, our model delivers insights
into the question of why some countries use CFC rules alongside thin-capitalization rules,
which are the primary policy instrument of governments to address debt shifting in multi-
national companies. A core reason is that the government is able to tackle ‘excessive’ debt
shifting, which is beyond the influence of existing thin-capitalization rules. Moreover, in
contrast to the thin-capitalization rule, the CFC rule also allows the governments to
increase the effective tax rate of home-based multinationals when multinationals’ invest-
ments exhibit a ‘home bias’ and investment of foreign-based multinationals responds more
elastically to tax incentives. In this case, the optimal policy is to use relatively lenient
thin-capitalization rules to attract FDI, but increase the effective tax rate on the home-
based multinational by means of a binding CFC rule. Thus, we highlight how and why
countries may discriminate between multinational companies.
Second, we rationalize the observed policy changes in the fields of thin-capitalization
and CFC regulation over the last decades. During this period, both the mobility of FDI
and the mobility of financial flows has accelerated dramatically, allowing multinationals
to exploit profit-shifting opportunities to a greater extent. Our analysis shows that a fall
in the mobility costs of FDI tightens the thin-capitalization rule, but relaxes the CFC
rule. In contrast, a fall in the costs of debt shifting to tax havens tightens both the thin-
capitalization rule and the CFC rule in the policy optimum. These results are consistent
with the development of thin-capitalization and CFC rules in the OECD countries as
summarized in Table 1.
A more rigorous test of our theoretical predictions could be based on country-specific
proxies for the mobility costs of FDI on the one hand, and the exposure of national
corporate tax bases to debt shifting by multinationals on the other. A suitable proxy for
the former might be the ‘Inward FDI Performance Index’ collected by UNCTAD, whereas
indicators of the latter could be the shares of corporate profits accruing in tax havens
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(see Zucman, 2014, for the case of U.S. multinationals), or the (inverse) number of Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) that a country has signed with tax havens.
According to our results, the openness to inward FDI on the one hand and to profit
shifting to tax havens on the other will jointly predict the tightness of thin-capitalization
and of CFC rules that are adopted by optimizing governments.
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Appendix A: Changes in economic conditions
To determine the signs of the derivatives in (23) and (24), we first derive the α-terms
given in (22). Using βn−1 = (t− τ)/δ from (6), these are
α1 =
2tr2
(1− t)f ′′ (t− τ)
[
1− τ
1− t + 1
]
< 0,
α2 = α3 = − tr
2
(1− t)f ′′
[
t− τ
1− t (λ+ β) +
β
n− 1 −
[f ′(k)− 2(λ+ β)r]
r
]
,
α4 = −(2− n)trk
(n− 1)2
β
(t− τ)2 +
tr
(1− t)f ′′
{
(λ+ β)2r
1− t −
β[f ′(k)− 3(λ+ β)r]
(t− τ)(n− 1)
}
< 0,
α5 =
(1− τh)r
1− th
∂k
∂s
< 0,
α6 =
2tr2βn
(1− t)f ′′
[
1− τ
(1− t)
1
n
+
1
(n− 1)
]
< 0,
α7 =
trk
(n− 1)2
β
δ(t− τ) −
tr
(1− t)f ′′
{
βn(λ+ β)r
n(1− t) +
β2r
n(n− 1)δ −
β[f ′(k)− 2(λ+ β)r]
(n− 1)δ
}
.
(A.1)
Among these terms, α4 is the second-order condition for the CFC rule τ
h; this has
to be negative to ensure a maximum. Sufficient conditions for α4 to be negative are that
n < 2 in the first term and [f ′(k) − 3(λ + β)r] < 0 in the second term. In what follows,
we assume that these conditions are both satisfied.
To sign α2 and α7 we further assume that transaction costs s are small in the initial
equilibrium. More precisely, we assume symmetry of countries h and f and s = 0 in
the initial equilibrium, arguing that the resulting conditions will approximately hold also
when s is positive, but small. With this assumption and using γ = 0, the first-order
condition for the thin-capitalization rule [eq. (17)] simplifies to
k
(t− τ) =
[f ′(k)− (λ+ β)r]
−(1− t)f ′′ . (A.2)
Using (A.2) in the simplified first-order condition for the CFC rule [eq. (19)] gives
β
(n− 1) = λ+ β (A.3)
as a further condition that must hold in an interior, symmetric equilibrium. Using (A.2)
and (A.3) in the expressions for α2 and α7 in (A.1) gives
α2 = α3 = − tr
2
(1− t)f ′′
[
t− τ
(1− t)(λ+ β)−
[f ′(k)− 3(λ+ β)r]
r
]
> 0,
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α7 =
(2− n)trβ
(n− 1)2δ
k
(t− τ) −
tr
(1− t)f ′′
{
βn(λ+ β)r
n(1− t) +
β2r
(n− 1)δ
[
1
n
+
1
(n− 1)
]}
> 0,
(A.4)
which can now be unambiguously signed from the second-order condition for the optimal
CFC rule [the term α4 in (A.1)].
We are now able to investigate the sign of the determinant |A| = α1α4 − α2α3. Using
(A.3) and rearranging terms leads to
α1α4 − α2α3 =
2t2r3
(1− t)2[f ′′]2
[
1− τ
1− t + 1
]
2− n
n− 1 [f
′(k)− (λ+ β)r] (λ+ β)
+
t2r3
(1− t)2[f ′′]2
[
t− τ
1− t + 4
]
t− τ
1− t (λ+ β)
2r
− t
2r2
(1− t)2[f ′′]2 [f
′(k)− 3(λ+ β)r] [f ′(k) + (λ+ β)r] > 0, (A.5)
which is unambiguously positive from the sufficient conditions for the second-order con-
dition α4 to be negative.
Increased mobility of FDI (fall in s): From the terms in (A.1) and (A.4) we imme-
diately obtain the effects of changes in the FDI mobility cost parameter s on the optimal
levels of λ and τ , as summarized in eq. (23) of the main text.
Increased financial mobility (fall in δ): To determine the effects of changes in δ on
the optimal policies λh and τ
h we need to calculate the terms α1α7−α3α6 and α4α6−α2α7
[cf. eq. (24)]. For the effect on the CFC rule τh, we get, after rearranging
α1α7 − α3α6 =
2t2r3
(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
n− 1
1− τ
1− t
(1− t)kf ′′
δ(n− 1)
+
2t2r3
(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
n− 1
1− τ
1− t
βn−1
n
[f ′ − (λ+ β)r]
+
2t2r3
(1− t)f ′′
β
n− 1
k
δ(n− 1) . (A.6)
Using (A.2) and simplifying results in
α1α7 − α3α6 = −2t
2(1− τ)(t− τ)r3
δ(1− t)3(f ′′)2
β [f ′ − (λ+ β)r]
n(n− 1)2 +
2t2r3βk
(1− t)f ′′(n− 1)2δ < 0. (A.7)
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For the effect on the thin-capitalization rule λh, we get
α4α6 − α2α7 =
+
2t2r2
δ(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
(n− 1)2
[
1− τ
1− t
βr
n
+
βr
n− 1
]
(2− n) [f ′ − (λ+ β)r]
− 2t
2r2
δ(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
n− 1
[
1− τ
1− t
βr
n
+
βr
n− 1
] [
φ− 1− τ
1− t (λ+ β)r
]
+
t2r2
δ(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
(n− 1)2
[
φ− 1− τ
1− t (λ+ β)r
]
[f ′ − (λ+ β)r]
− t
2r2
δ(1− t)2(f ′′)2
β
n− 1
[
φ− 1− τ
1− t (λ+ β)r
] [
φ− βr
n
1− τ
1− t
]
, (A.8)
where φ = f ′ − 2(λ+ β). After some simplifications, we arrive at
α4α6 − α2α7 = (2− n)t
2r2β[f ′ − (λ+ β)r]
(1− t)2(f ′′)2(n− 1)2δ
[
f ′ − (2− n)
n
(1− τ)
(1− t) (λ+ β)r
]
− t
2r3β2
δ(1− t)2(f ′′)2(n− 1)
{
f ′ − (λ+ β)r
[
3 +
(t− τ)
(1− t)
]}[
(1− τ)
(1− t)
1
n
+
1
(n− 1)
]
. (A.9)
In (A.9), the second term is positive since [f ′ − 3(λ + β)r] < 0 from the second-order
condition α4 in (A.1). Since (2−n) > 0 the first term is also positive provided that n > 1
is sufficiently above unity. Equations (A.7) and (A.9) then sign (24) in the main text. 
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